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SAVING THE LOST SHEEP: BRINGING
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES BACK INTO THE FOLD
WITH A NEW EPA DECISIONMAKING PARADIGM
Victor B. Flatt*
Abstract: Currently, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses benefit-cost
analysis in making many of its regulatory and enforcement decisions. This Article argues that,
although required in some instances, the EPA's benefit-cost analysis procedure is incomplete,
deeply flawed, and may even violate statutes in some respects. Much of the controversy
surrounding environmental regulation can be attributed to this flawed benefit-cost analysis.
This Article proposes a new paradigm for EPA regulatory decisionmaking. The proposed
paradigm is a four-step decisionmaking process that enhances the outcome of the EPA's
decisions by highlighting values that are often ignored or outside the traditional benefit-cost
analysis but are necessary to comply with many of our environmental laws and for effective
environmental regulation.

INTRODUCTION
There are times in one's life that are singular, when one sees clearly
an issue that has bedeviled and eluded one before. Such a time in my life
occurred on May 20, 1994, at the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) Region X management retreat in Kirkland, Washington. At that
time, I was teaching environmental law and policy at the University of
Washington's Graduate School of Public Affairs. As a local "expert" on
environmental policy, I was asked to present to the management retreat
my views on current EPA decisionmaking issues and problems.
I was very excited by the invitation, and indeed, I was eager to address
this issue with them. I had already been formulating a theory that the
EPA's decisions were often guided by incomplete informationspecifically, that the people who worked for the EPA did not address all
of the values Congress intended in the enabling acts of various

* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. The author would like to thank
his research assistant, Amy Major, for her excellent skills and insight into this piece. The author
would also like to thank the 1994 and 1995 classes in environmental policy at the University of
Washington's Graduate School of Public Affairs for their patience with a working version of this
idea. Special thanks to Professor Carol Rose, Clark Gaulding and the EPA Region X office, and my
excellent editor Beth Bryant. A very special thank you to Dr. Jeffrey Wainstein, whose patience
made the generation of this idea possible.
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environmental laws.' I therefore decided that I was going to encourage
those policymakers at the EPA's Region X to try to get back to the
legislative roots, to try to address again those "squishy" values like
ecological integrity and purity, with which we as rational beings are not
often comfortable.
My texts were the laws themselves: the Clean Water, Clean Air, and
Endangered Species Acts. As its goal, the Clean Water Act does not
propose that we determine how much of a pollutant put into water is
cost-beneficial, but instead proposes that we "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."2 The
Clean Air Act does not have as its goal a level of air pollution that is
cost-beneficial, but a control of air pollution that will "protect the public
health"3 and "preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality in national
parks, national wilderness areas, national monuments, national seashores,
and other areas." 4 The Endangered Species Act does not protect
endangered species of animals and plants just because they have a
market value, but because they have "esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation."5
Before I began, I wondered whether these EPA managers would even
understand what I was trying to say-whether they had any appreciation
for the "squishy" environmental values I believed Congress intended for
them to consider. I need not have worried. For with that speech I struck a
deep chord.
After reminding them of their childhood love of nature and why they
originally wanted to work with the environment, I began to see heads
nodding in understanding. The reaction was more than a polite
acknowledgement of yet another intellectual's quaint ideas. I felt
communion where I thought there was only solitude. That was the
singular moment. At that time I realized that my own concerns and
disquiet were not unique. Those EPA managers and I shared a common
concern for our environment that we knew was not being addressed in
spite of our best efforts. The emperor, if not naked, was certainly scantily
1. See Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: CorrectingNEPA Implementation by
Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as Environmental Values
Under NEPA, 46 Hastings L.J. 85 (1994).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (1994).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(3) (1994).
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clad, and now we could all say it out loud. We could criticize our current
methods of environmental decisionmaking without fear of being called
irrational or stupid.
. But, as a tent revival something was incomplete. The damnation was
there, but the redemption was not. Yes, we were all troubled, but where
was our salvation? There can be no mass conversion if there is nothing to
convert to, and so that day, although important, was ultimately
disappointing. For although we knew we were "sinning," we did not
know how to get to the "promised land."
I now hope this shortcoming can be remedied. Although it may not be
perfect, I believe I can offer one method for decisionmakers at the EPA
to consider all the environmental values relevant to their decisionmaking
under the various environmental laws. This new method is rational and
fully recognizes the requirements of environmental decisionmaking the
environmental laws set out; but, the method also accepts the inescapable
need for some analysis that may be called "subjective" because it is not
reducible to a standard mathematical model.
Although it is anathema to some decision choice theorists, I am
convinced that the implementation of environmental laws cannot be done
correctly without a recognition of certain "squishy" values that have not
been historically quantifiable by the traditional benefit-cost analysis.
Although this does make the process susceptible to a certain subjectivity,
it does so no more than ignoring these values altogether in an attempt to
claim rational decisionmaking. And, by this method decisionmakers can
at least be aware of, and acknowledge limitations caused by, this
subjectivity. Ultimately, this will force those who are required to choose
among subjective policy choices (our Congress and state legislatures) to
make choices in an open manner with full input and not escape the hard
choice by claiming that an environmental agency need only apply a
technical formula to determine the right answer.
However, before we reach the "heaven" of correct environmental
implementation, we must first review why the current method of
decisionmaking does not get us there. There is no reason to go on the
"straight and narrow" if the "broad and wide" leads to the same place.
Therefore, Part I of this Article reviews the current, predominant EPA
decisionmaking paradigm-benefit-cost analysis, discusses the problems
with that paradigm, and explores why it ignores certain important
environmental values recognized in legislation. Part II analyzes
requirements and alternatives for a new paradigm. Part III proposes a
new paradigm that would be a superior alternative to the current model
for the purpose of making better informed environmental decisions
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consistent with legislative goals and requirements, and examines the
workings of the new paradigm in context. Part IV concludes by applying
the new paradigm to a recent EPA policy decision.
I.

FOR THE CURRENT PATH IS BROAD AND WIDE: THE
PROBLEMS WITH BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

A.

The Problem of EnvironmentalDecisionmaking

Various federal environmental laws charge the EPA with the power of
implementing the laws and turning them into concrete requirements. The
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to promulgate national ambient air
quality standards that are "requisite to protect the public health." 6 The
Clean Water Act allows the EPA to permit discharges of pollution to
water if the discharges do not violate ambient standards for pollutants in
that water.' The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) allows the EPA to charge a private
party the cost of cleaning up a site that is contaminated with hazardous
wastes if that site "may present an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare." 8 A whole host of laws require the EPA to set
standards, translate those standards into individual requirements, and
determine when those requirements have been violated.9
Due to the nature and complexity of environmental problems,
however, the implementation of such directives is not easy. This is
particularly true of the first step: setting standards. What is the level of
ozone at which the "public health" will be protected? I° At what
concentration does a "hazardous substance" become an "imminent and
substantial danger to the public health"?"
Many environmental laws have general proscriptions against
"harmful" pollutants, but the term itself is usually not defined. Although
such a term may seem superficially clear, most environmental pollutants
are not inherently harmful, but are only harmful in certain quantities
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
7. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994).
9. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a)(1).
10. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
11. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
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and/or certain unwanted locations. 2 Indeed, most so-called pollutants are
either useful in some way or consist of the byproducts of otherwise
desirable outcomes. 3 Moreover, although many substances have been
identified as potentially harmful to human or ecosystem health, a
definitive harm is often difficult to prove, particularly in specific cases. 4
Far from being certain, a general proscription against "harmfll"

pollutants, or a requirement to protect public health, requires the EPA as
the administering agency to answer a whole host of questions.
B.

The Use ofBenefit-Cost Analysis

Because of the difficulty of environmental problem solving, the EPA
has particularly resorted to one paradigm to assist in this endeavor:

benefit-cost analysis.'

In benefit-cost analysis, the agency tries to

determine whether an action should be taken by weighing the costs of
taking that action versus the benefits of taking that action. 6 The option
with the highest benefit-cost ratio is optimal. 7 Typically, in the United

States the calculation uses dollars as a common currency of costs and
benefits. 8 This presumably allows a mathematical weighing of choices
to select the one with the greatest net positive benefit. 9
The EPA must use benefit-cost analysis in certain circumstances. By
executive order, all federal agencies have been required for almost

twenty years to prepare benefit-cost analyses on all federal regulations
and generally to use these analyses in making decisions absent a specific

12. "SeePeter S. Menell & Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 260-61 (1994).
For instance, the criteria air pollutants are so ubiquitous because they are primarily by-products of
oxidation from energy production (cars, power plants, etc.), and the Clean Air Act assumes that there
is some safe level of these by-product pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
13. See Menell & Stewart, supra note 12, at 189. For example,' all of the current criteria air
pollutants are by-products of fossil fuel combustion, which is the backbone of our society's energy
and transportation.
14. See id. at 163. For instance, note the difficulty in proving at what exposure level benzene, a
known human carcinogen, might be safe. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
15. Although one often sees the term expressed as "cost-benefit," "benefit-cost" is the term most
often used in today's literature.
16. See Edward M. Gramlich, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis 8 (2d ed. 1990).
17. See id. at41-45.
18. See id. at51-54.
19. See id. atS.
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requirement to the contrary.2" Moreover, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 codifies the analysis requirement for regulations that will
have an annual economic impact of over $100 million, although it does
not require that decisions be based on this analysis.2 But, environmental
laws represent some of the few examples wherein consideration of
regulatory costs in making regulatory decisions is explicitly prohibited.22
This exceptional requirement is very important in the environmental
arena, and it was put there because the dominant benefit-cost paradigm
does not always work well in the environmental context. As stated in an
earlier article examining the use of the benefit-cost paradigm in
environmental regulation:
The history of the environmental movement and environmental
regulations indicate that federal agencies did not understand or
consider environmental values in the traditional cost-benefit
analysis paradigm employed in the postwar period. Therefore, to
protect the environment from practices and decisions which
continued to abuse it, Congress prohibited a seemingly logical
paradigm-cost-benefit analysis-in certain environmental laws.2
Thus, Congress itself has realized that the EPA should not use benefitcost analysis alone in making many of its environmental policy
determinations, and this also loosely indicates that despite practice to the
contrary, there is no real legal impediment to using another system to
inform regulatory decisions.
Nevertheless, despite its prohibition in these important cases, the EPA
uses benefit-cost analysis for its decisionmaking paradigm across the
board. It does so even in the face of court decisions holding that using
such analysis in that way violates the law.24 Although the courts have

20. President Jimmy Carter was the first to implement benefit-cost analysis for executive branch
agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). Presidents Reagan and Clinton
issued similar directives. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
21. See2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (Supp. 1995).
22. Victor B. Flatt, Environmental "Contraction"for America? (Or How IStopped Worrying and
Learned to Love the EPA), 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 585, 601 (1996). For instance, the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 states that decisions to list endangered species are to be based solely on the
"best scientific and commercial data." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994). The Act provides no
exception for economic impacts.
23. Flatt, supra note 22, at 603 (footnote omitted).
24. See Mark K. Landy et al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong
Questions 65-70 (1990); see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
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clearly recognized Congress's prohibition of benefit-cost analysis in
certain environmental circumstances,2' many of the EPA's policy
decisions are effectively insulated from such scrutiny. Given the
scientific uncertainty involved in most environmental decisions, the EPA
can use benefit-cost analysis to pick and choose among certain scientific
studies, choosing a low cost regulatory setting over a more expensive but
possibly safer one for instance, without having to acknowledge its use.26
In the book The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong
Questions, the authors describe how benefit-cost analysis considerations
were factored into the EPA's decision in the 1970s to set the ozone
standard at .12 parts per million (ppm) instead of .08 ppm, in direct
contravention of the legal requirement.2 7 This type of analysis is so
common that it is openly advocated in spite of its illegality. For instance,
in the EPA's recent attempt to ratchet down the ozone and particulate
standard to better protect human health, critics in Congress of the
proposed new standard, oblivious or antipathetic to the overriding
"protection of human health" requirement in the law itself, based their
criticism primarily on the high cost.2"
C.

Why the EPA Uses Benefit-CostAnalysis

Even though it is legally prohibited from doing so in certain cases, the
EPA's default use of this type of analysis is understandable, because of
both the difficulty in analyzing values outside this context and the
difficulty in justifying a decision based on such an alternative analysis.
From a policy perspective, in the abstract at least it is hard to criticize the
logic of using benefit-cost analysis in making regulatory decisions, even
in the face of explicit congressional disapproval. Who does not want
more benefit than they pay for? Is this not always better for the public?
Although the use of a benefit-cost paradigm is logical in the abstract,
it is not always the best way for making decisions. Individual decisions
based on benefit-cost analysis are almost always likely to be accurate ex
ante because individuals (usually) have access to perfect information
("mhe statute and its legislative history make clear that economic considerations play no part in the
promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section 109.").
25. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
26. See Flatt, supra note 22, at 602.

27. See Landy et al., supra note 24, at 65-70.
28. See Joby Warrick & John E. Yang, Stricter Air Quality Rules May Test Hill's New Veto,
Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1996, atAl.
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about their wants and desires. However, when these desires must be
subject to rational calculation or justified to another person in order to
make a group decision, the situation becomes much more difficult. In
those cases, benefit-cost analysis must necessarily be reduced to a
consideration of those benefits and costs that can easily be discussed and
weighed by everyone involved in a decision. Decisions open to
discussion must be justified on an explainable benefit-cost basis even
though the action was almost certainly taken based on that individual's
personal benefit-cost assumptions, which by definition makes it the best
choice from that individual's perspective.
Many a struggling environmentalist has had to try to justify why
recycling certain goods is an appropriate personal decision in the face of
"objective" studies showing that recycling certain kinds of materials is
not cost-effective. Imagine how much more difficult it is to explain why,
in order to protect wildlife diversity, an isolated wetland should not be
filled in one case but can be filled in another. It is no wonder that the
EPA. moves in the direction of justifying decisions based on rational,
reproducible values. Unfortunately, this is not the benefit-cost paradigm
that could dictate the perfect decision, but one that is hollow and onesided (biased toward the more easily "explainable" decision). For that
reason, it may lead to a decision that is as or more arbitrary than a
decision that is not explicitly justified by "rational" calculations.
Of course, there may be other advantages in requiring agencies such
as the EPA to justify their actions in terms of explicit, logical reasons.
We certainly want our agencies to have good reasons behind their
decisions. It would be difficult to analyze an agency decision saying:
"We made the decision that way because we wanted to!" Federal
agencies are subject to certain expectations of rationality and subject to
the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 29 These agencies must
present some rational, clear way for making decisions.3" Rules and
standard setting must be conceived and implemented fairly. Because it is
historically the only paradigm for this kind of rational decisionmaking,
benefit-cost analysis becomes the irresistible paradigm for agency
decisions, particularly those that involve rulemaking. Many decisions

29. See U.S. Const. amend. V; John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Judicial Deference
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 635-37 (1996); see also
5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996) (supplying arbitrary and capricious standard).
30. See Ernest M. Jones, A Component Approach to Minimal Rationality Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 275 (1987).
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have to be justified to various interest groups; it is always easier to point
to some numeric reason for a decision, rather than a non-numeric one, as
if the agency were merely plugging inputs into a formula that would give
anyone the same answer.
D.

Why Benefit-CostAnalysis Fails in the Environmental Context

The major problem with the use of benefit-cost analysis to make
decisions in the environmental context is that we do not have a common
way to express or discuss all the "goods" and the "bads" or reduce them
to numeric values. Thus, many types of "goods" and "bads" that would
influence our individual environmental decisions are simply ignored.
This leaves benefit-cost analysis a poor vehicle for selecting our
preferences. According to Louis Uchitelle, one prominent economist has
noted that pushing the correct lever to make the economy grow "is not
the same thing as achieving the life we want to live or constructing the
society we want to inhabit."'
In the environmental context, this problem is particularly acute. The
degree of benefits and risks from controlling pollution is uncertain, due
to uncertainties in scientific understanding of the impacts of pollution on
human health and the environment. Most environmental testing is done
through animal studies at extremely high doses and questionable
extrapolation and through uncontrolled past history epidemiological
studies.32 This leaves the level of harm for amounts of a pollutant
uncertain and makes it difficult to compare harm to benefits.33 Thus,
benefit-cost analysis tends to focus on costs and benefits that can be
more easily quantified in dollar terms.34 Harm to ecosystems is often
calculated by using market value for natural resources, even though most
environmental amenities are not sold on the open market and are not
completely valued if they are.35 Quantification of harms in benefit-cost
analysis is usually attempted in the area of human health, but although
this can put the decision in sharper focus, it still requires an answer to the

31. Louis Uchitelle, Opportunity Lost, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1997, at G2 (reviewing John E.
Schwarz, Illusion ofOpportunity (1997)) (citing Amartya Sen, Harvard University).
32. See Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of Low-Exposure Carcinogens: A New Approach to
JudicialAnalysisofScientificEvidence, 14 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 283, 294 (1991).
33. See id. at 293-96.
34. See Flatt, supra note 22, at 603.
35. See Ohio v. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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question: "How valuable is a human life?"--a value that many would say
is philosophically unquantifiable.36
Even the simplest environmental decisions implicate more values than
can be considered using only benefit-cost analysis. For example, how
does the EPA craft a truly cost-beneficial decision in a context in which
exact market prices are not known or cannot be calculated? A
determination of whether a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) water permit should be issued under the Clean Water
Act requires the EPA to determine if the permit meets a particular
ambient standard, determined by the state environmental agency, to
protect environmental health (or some other goal).37 But, doing this
pursuant to a true benefit-cost paradigm also requires weighing that goal.
How many dollars is it worth to have a small creek that is "fishable"? Or,
how many dollars is it worth for us to know that it is "fishable," even if
we do not fish there? Of course, such questions cannot be answered
directly with traditional benefit-cost analysis; indeed, in that context it is
so irrelevant that sometimes the EPA does not even ask the question.
Many times in practice the EPA and the state agencies to which clean
water programs have been delegated in some states simply do not
consider water quality criteria at all in making permit decisions" 39
despite the fact that the Clean Water Act explicitly requires it.
The EPA, along with other regulatory agencies, has shown some
willingness to delve into these issues when it is trying to quantify human
health values,40 but that is only part of the picture. The EPA still
routinely underrates other environmental values that Congress has
specifically indicated are to be given weight in environmental
decisionmaking. 4' This focus on human health or market goods alone, to
the exclusion of other important environmental values, undermines the
legitimacy of environmental values that are specified by Congress and
36. See generally Nick Smith, Comment, Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary
Jurisprudence,45 Buffalo L. Rev. 503 (1997).
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1994).
38. See generally Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (criticizing
State of Georgia's Environmental Protection Division for its failure to calculate pollutant loading's
effect on water quality in its NPDES permit decision).
39. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
40. See Landy et al., supranote 24, at 180-83.
41. See Flatt, supra note 1, at 94. For instance, the Department of Interior, in consultation with the
EPA, often fails to provide for proper endangered species recovery plans due to economic impact
concerns even though the Endangered Species Act clearly requires this.
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are important to the public.42 How does one calculate the value of an
endangered snail darter and compare it to the value of a major dam on a
major river system? What about the value of a beautiful view? Even
more difficult is how to give voice to the philosophical values of
environmental law that plainly inform our society and even our laws.43
More than this, benefit-cost analysis effectively excludes the public
from meaningful discussion and participation in what is appropriate for
the environment. As Michael P. Vandenbergh stated in his critique
of the current EPA decision models, "environmental debate is
dysfunctional.... The public is generally disengaged."' Eileen Gauna
suggests that environmental debates have come to be structured as
"battles of experts" with no attention paid to other values not involved in
making technical tradeoffs.4 5
Because of these problems, criticism of the EPA's use of the
traditional benefit-cost paradigm to make environmental decisions has
been legion.46 The use of this paradigm also contributes to much
uncertainty about policy direction, as it is unclear just which values the
EPA can shoehorn into its old paradigm for decisionmaking. The very
failure to speak in a common language about which values we are
considering or should consider may explain much of the current conflict
over environmental policy in our country.47 Michael Vandenbergh notes
that "environmental law reform remains in gridlock," primarily because
the debate does not center on the norm-creating issues at the heart of the
environmental movement.48
However, despite the failings of this paradigm, the uncertainty over its
use, and its illegality when used in a way that iginores legislativelymandated requirements, the push to continue such analysis and eliminate
any non-quantifiable value judgments that remain in the process is
inexorable in our modem society. In the United States there is a growing
chorus of regulatory reformists who want to push the EPA and other

42. See id. at 102-03.
43. Seeid at98.
44. Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link
EnvironmentalTargets in EnvironmentalLaw, 85 Ky. L.. 803, 862 (1996-97).
45. Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participationand the Paradigm
Paradox,17 Stan. Envtl. L.L 3, 9-10 (1998).
46. See Flatt,supra note 1, at 103.
47. See Flatt, supra note 22, at 604-05.
48. Vandenbergh, supra note 44, at 861.
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federal agencies into utilizing a more stringent form of benefit-cost
analysis, particularly one that only looks at these so-called objective,
reproducible values.49 The further we go down the "broad and wide"
path, the wider it becomes and the harder it is to turn back. In the name
of science and good public policy, we have already moved far from the
aspirational goals of environmental protection that began the
environmental movement. If we do not stop soon, "redemption" may be
too late.
Itisnot that benefit-cost analysis is not useful or that it cannot have
influence in understanding aspirational goals. The connection between
the aspirational goals of environmental protection and the realities of
funding those goals forces the agency to consider costs and benefits in
some way."0 Indeed, one could interpret the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act to require a quantification of as many costs and benefits as
possible."' But, by encouraging or continuing to allow the EPA to base
its decisions solely on such a paradigm without examining the problems
of recognizing difficult-to-quantify policy choices, we delude ourselves
into thinking that decisions made using such an analysis are objective
when obviously they are not. As Eileen Gauna stated: "Experts
increasingly recognize that even technical and scientific solutions to
environmental problems involve value judgments. The desired level of
environmental protection and corresponding strategies employed to
achieve these desired levels are recognized as questions which are
inherently political as well as technical... 2 "Analytic" analysis is a false
god. As much modem legal scholarship on perspective has suggested, it
may be impossible to separate emotions and subjectivity from legal
decisionmaking.5 3 Values that Congress clearly intended to be considered
in the implementation of environmental laws may be ignored altogether
or considered partially, depending upon the particular agency
decisionmaker or agency approach to a given problem. 4

49. See Flatt, supranote 22, at 605.
50. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than JudicialLiteralism, 53
Wash.& Lee L. Rev. 1231, 1254 (1996).
51. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (Supp. 1995).
52. Gauna, supra note 45, at 24 (citations omitted).
53. See Peter Halewood, White Men Can't Jump: CriticalEpistemologies, Embodiment, and the
PraxisofLegal Scholarship,7 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 2 (1995).
54. See Landy et al., supra note 24, at 80.
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By continuing down this road, we also fail to address the real
questions that bedevil our society over the environment, such as how
much we are willing to pay for our safety or who should be protected.
This delays the hard choices that must be made and imposes exorbitant
transaction costs on our society as we grapple in the courts over "who
has the right to clean air?" and "who has a right to be protected?," but
does so in the guise of "technological, scientific" decisions. How is a
court to decide whether one scientific study concerning health risks is
more accurate than another when the proponent of a scientific study is
actually concerned with the costs of regulatory compliance?
To the EPA's credit, it has attempted to bridge the gap between
environmental goals and numeric benchmarks that are being pushed in
regulatory reform by attempting to place numeric values on these hardto-quantify values, and then bringing them into the benefit-cost analysis.
For instance, the EPA has tried to use new numeric tools such as
Contingent Valuation Methodology (CVM) to assign reliable, rational
values to more esoteric environmental concerns; but, with many interests
at stake in such an analysis, CVM has been criticized for inconsistency
and inaccuracy.55 Ironically, the very forces that insist on EPA regulatory
science as a basis for decisionmaking are those that criticize the EPA's
attempt to address non-traditional environmental values in that regulatory
framework. Even the EPA's willingness to try such valuation does not
address the deeper problems of framing all of our environmental disputes
as numeric calculations.
What is clear is that traditional benefit-cost analysis as the sole basis
for agency decisionmaking does not work in the environmental context
because it ignores important environmental values that Congress has
indicated must be considered in environmental decisionmaking; an
attempt simply to patch the problem by using CVM (or like methods)
may not be enough. By focusing entirely on this paradigm, the EPA
strives for more and more technical certainty, causing its vision of the
problems and issues to narrow. It also plays into the hands of those who
stress that EPA decisionmaking must fit into benefit-cost analysis. It
seems there is a belief that if there were better air quality modeling or if
the causal pathways of cancer were better understood, the regulatory
decisions of the EPA would be better. Of course more information is
desirable, but this will only go so far in the environmental arena because
of the great diversity of values and issues at play there. No amount of
55. See Menell & Stewart, supranote 12, at 1192-96.
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fine tuning of benefit-cost analysis and no amount of externality pricing
is going to make EPA regulation better unless the EPA and Congress can
again understand, appreciate, and address the totality of environmental
values and concerns that underlie our federal environmental laws. This
calls for the rejection of the benefit-cost paradigm. A new paradigm for
EPA decisionmaking must consider all values, environmental and
otherwise, and point out policy questions and deficiencies so that
Congress and the democratic process can address them and they are not
simply buried for the benefit of one interest group or the other.
II.

WHAT WILL THE STRAIGHT AND NARROW LOOK LIKE?
WHAT A NEW PARADIGM SHOULD DO

Now that we realize benefit-cost analysis is not appropriate for
environmental analysis, what should we use? Where do we turn?
Although some critics have offered proposals, few have addressed all of
the problem. This section reviews some of the suggestions and points out
requirements for a new paradigm.
A.

Some Proposalsfor Change

Critics have made some attempts to push the EPA into making
corrections to its regulatory process. Proposals include moving away
from the command and control regime, returning to common law
strategies, and allowing more public input. 6 Although some of these
proposals address certain of the EPA's shortcomings, most fall far short
of recognizing the central issue of whether the EPA is recognizing all
appropriate values. One recent proposal to alter EPA decisionmaking
does come close to addressing this issue. It proposes a model based on
the Netherlands system, whereby certain policy goals are to be
considered prior to implementation decisions-a laudable proposal that
refocuses administrative action toward the examination and effective,
orderly implementation of statutory values." Despite the good start this
makes in addressing the issues needing change, it does not address a
method or mechanism of implementation. However, such a mechanism is
possible and its form conceivable. In recounting the problems of the
benefit-cost paradigm in accommodating all important environmental

56. See Vandenbergh, supra note 44, at 859-60.
57. See id. at 803-918.
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values in decisionmaking, one can see many of the requirements that are
necessary for a new paradigm if it is to exceed the current one in
effectiveness.
B.

What the New ParadigmShould Require

Initially, the new paradigm must alter the EPA's environmental policy
implementation and decisionmaking by broadening the considered
factors to encompass all factors underlying our environmental laws. This
requires a close review of congressional intent. If legislation such as the
Clean Air Act explicitly rejects pure benefit-cost analysis in regulatory
decisions, the agency must ascertain which values are to be given
broader consideration and by how much. Of course this process will not
be perfect, but neither is the current method that ignores these values.
Although this is a start, a mere identification of values would not be
sufficient to create a new paradigm. Having worked with and given
presentations to the EPA, I realize that much of the problem in
environmental policy formulation and analysis is providing a method to
do it. One reason that benefit-cost analysis has gained wide acceptance is
because it is widely taught and seen as an objective way of reaching a
conclusion. There is an understandable demand for a uniform approach
to be used in making agency decisions. 8 Therefore, a new paradigm that
will incorporate or at least recognize the values that have been missing
from benefit-cost analysis must include a step-by-step process that EPA
personnel can use in conducting such an analysis.
Even without full reproducible objectivity, a new paradigm should
preserve fairness and impartiality, not only because it is required by due
process, but because any decisionmaking process must be perceived as
supportable and fair to the general populace. Without that support, a new
paradigm will wither before it can grow. Such a paradigm does not
necessarily have to lead to a decision that a court could review de novo.9
Just as the courts defer to an agency's valuation in benefit-cost analysis,
they can defer to the incorporation of all values in the decisionmaking
process as long as it is done in a way that is consistent, not irrational.6"
The new paradigm should not be a neo-Luddite rejection of market
values and quantification. Clearly, our environmental decisions depend a
58. See supraPart I.C.
59. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980).
60. See supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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great deal on how the market values certain costs and benefits. And, even
in a perfect world where the EPA can alter its internal decisionmaking, it
is still subject to reform legislation such as the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act, where monetary costs and benefits are to be calculated.6 '
After all, environmental decisions do not exist in a vacuum. Comparisons
across administrative programs must be undertaken, and to the extent we
want Congress to make policy choices, benefits and costs of all kinds
must be debated. Ignoring traditional benefits and costs or avoiding the
use of comparison tools gives as incomplete a picture as ignoring other
less tangible values. Thus, a new paradigm must retain all useful aspects
of benefit-cost, while finding a way to incorporate the analysis into a
broader paradigm.
Lastly, in the places that lack certainty, the new method should
highlight this fact, throwing into relief points where policy decisions
must be made. Although such a process will not purport to give an
objective, reproducible answer to environmental policy formulation
issues, it should put the critical issues into relief, leading to an open and
honest discussion of the actual value choices that our government and
society want to make about our environment.
This increases transparency and also calls for more government
accountability, pushing policy decisions into a more democratic arena.62
For instance, where a great deal of scientific uncertainty is present in an
environmental decision, the agency can pick and choose among other
values, such as economic impact, and justify its choice by selecting the
scientific study best accommodating these values.63 By acknowledging
values openly, the values themselves can be debated.
III. CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER: A PARADIGM PROPOSAL
Given the requirements that would be needed for the new paradigm,
the following four-step method should serve as a new paradigm for
environmental decisionmaking. It essentially takes the decisionmaker
through four steps and requires a decision point, or analysis of policy, to
move on to the next step. It does not eliminate a calculation of benefits
and costs, but applies it only where appropriate, without sacrificing
61. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (Supp. 1995).
62. See Landy et al., supra note 24, at 79 (noting that educating public to make correct policy
choices and being responsive to those choices should be among goals of agency action).
63. See Flatt, supranote 22, at 609.
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policy nuances or uncertainties that must be addressed. Each step
requires an answer to a question. Many of the questions may not lead to a
decision but instead may lead to a realization that the decision is more
appropriately made elsewhere.
In order to address correctly the questions raised at each step, the
decisionmaker should keep in mind certain considerations that are likely
to arise in the context of environmental regulation. Because of their
commonness and importance, these factors should be addressed
explicitly at each stage. Even if the agency decides that the factor is not
particularly important at a given stage, it will at least have generated a
conscious consideration that could lead to necessary and appropriate
input.
The four steps to be addressed sequentially are as follows:
I.

Is there a pollutant or environmental harm to be addressed?

II.

What is the goal with respect to regulating that harm? For
example, do we want to reduce the pollutant to natural,
background levels; "beneficial," non-harmful levels (to
humans or other things); or some level that can be attained in,
an economically efficient manner?

III. Where do we set a regulatory level to meet that goal?
IV. Policy Implementation: How do we get to that level?
The following is the checklist of considerations that should be
addressed at each of the four primary steps:"
1.

Values choices and assignment of entitlements: Who has the
rights? Which rights?

2.

How much scientific uncertainty is present? Can it be
bounded? If one scientific study is to be preferred over
another, why is that so?

3.

Based upon our consideration of rights and values choices, as
well as market values, what are the costs and benefits of this
decision?

64. Other factors could be added to or subtracted from this list depending on particular
substantive areas or emerging or evolving considerations.
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4.

What are the efficiency considerations, including enforceability and understandability of the regulations?

5.

How may fairness and equity be served?6"

6.

Does the regulatory choice assist in educating the public or
affected groups?
Is the decision or implementation constitutionally and/or

7.

legislatively permissible?
One could obviously add other considerations, and these considerations
may not apply equally to each of the four steps, but this is a manageable
list that provides many of the important considerations in environmental
regulation.
Overall, this four step analytic paradigm and the accompanying
considerations are useful for examining environmental policies for
several reasons. First, each step of the framework poses an important
question, or series of questions, that requires decisionmakers to think
clearly and thoroughly about the existence and nature of an
environmental problem. Second, each step allows the decisionmaker to
focus on subjective issues and analyze policy choices in a consistent and
methodical manner.
Step I identifies the specific pollutant or harm that is to be addressed.
Defined broadly, all environmental policies should be able to fit within
this identification rubric: Is the specific pollutant or harm a toxic waste, a
loss of biodiversity, air pollution, or something else? This step is critical
because it forces the decisionmaker first to address the question of
whether a harm or problem truly exists and the nature of that harm. This
is the "sixty-four billion dollar" question in current environmental
regulatory debates.
In order for regulation to be effective and efficient, the harm must be
described as accurately and specifically as possible at this first stage.
Certainly there are many reasons why a substance may be harmful. Many
substances have proven health impacts, and a society might simply wish
certain products to be eliminated for aesthetic or philosophical reasons.
Nevertheless, if a society does not determine whether and/or why a harm
is to be regulated, the later regulatory decisions become much more

65. Many would argue that fairness and equity should always be among the values choices.
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difficult and potentially expensive as various solutions may only work to
eliminate certain parts of the harm.
Of the seven factors that are to be considered with each step, two are
of particular importance here. The most important is the factor of
scientific uncertainty. Generally, scientific information is required to
discover whether certain types of harm, such as health effects, are
associated with particular substances. Through scientific studies, we
gather over time evidence for or against the existence and extent of a
problem. Such studies would ideally include accurate quantitative data
that would allow for an initial examination of the magnitude or presence
of a harm. Yet, even with advanced equipment for testing and measuring,
exact quantitative data regarding the effects of various substances
(particularly subtle or long-term effects) are notoriously difficult to
calculate.66 Since we live in a complex world with many environmental
exposures and interactions, separating one substance's effect from
another's is often difficult, even if measurements are extremely
accurate.67 Moreover, because of past incidents of incomplete or lack of
consent, direct human testing of harms is legally and morally suspect.6"
The best we can often hope for is the identification of a range of
exposures at which a substance becomes an environmental harm.
How then is Step I to be addressed or answered explicitly in the face
of uncertainty? Doing nothing does not help. To say there is no harm in
the face of uncertainty and therefore no need for regulation seems just as
wrong as saying that there is harm that requires regulation. In such a
situation, the decisionmaker is forced to consider another important
factor: values.
Social and political realities have a tremendous influence upon the
question of whether environmental harms are harmful enough to warrant
a particular level of intervention. Much of the high level of today's
environmental concern can be traced to changing awareness of harms
and increased appreciation of natural and health values.69 A consideration
of values may also require analysis of resource allocation preferences.
Political realities, combined with moral concerns, influence the
palatability of regulating certain segments of the economy, the protection
66. See Flatt, supranote 32, at 294.
67. See id. at 295.
68. See Laura Johannes, MIT, Quaker Oats to Pay $1.85 Million to Kids Fed Radioactive Cereal
in Test, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at B6.
69. See Percival et al., EnvironmentalRegulation:Law, Science, and Policy 2-6 (1992).
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of certain populations, and the amount of funding to accomplish
regulation. When faced with uncertainty, value systems can influence
who is given rights, accountability, and responsibility for environmental
harm. In the best of all possible worlds, values choices at the regulatory
level are not made in a vacuum, but are made to be consistent with the
dictates of enabling legislation. In the absence of that guidance, an
agency such as the EPA may have to make a values choice, and it is
better to do this explicitly. When the choice is made explicitly, the choice
can be defined for purposes of debate. As Vandenbergh stated, "At the
outset, the debate over establishment of the initial... goals could
stimulate open discussion about the importance of environmental
protection and the trade-offs involved in environmental measures."7
Moreover, if the values choice concerning the need for regulation of a
perceived harm differs from that of the body politic, legislatures will
have an opportunity to clearly change the governing values or policy
choice.
The purpose of Step II of the framework is to identify the goal or
goals in controlling the now determined environmental harm. At this
step, decisionmakers must decide what the goal of harm regulation may
be. This is not necessarily as simple as it appears at first glance. Many
people assume that simply because something is identified as an
environmental harm, complete elimination of it is required. This is not
necessarily preferred and may not be feasible. Instead, using benefit-cost
analysis and notions of equity or fairness, we as a society may wish to
regulate the harm only to a particular level. We might prefer a return to
natural, safe, or even economically efficient levels, instead of "zero"
level, and even these terms require further definition. Natural at what
time in Earth's history? Safe for whom? And how safe is safe? How is
cost efficiency to be considered, if at all? These are questions that must
be determined explicitly. Otherwise, these values choices will be made
haphazardly at another time, with high transaction costs due to
incomplete information or failure to determine goals.
Although decisionmakers and politicians tend to shy away from
making explicit determinations about human safety and health, a de facto
determination will be made in any event. Explicitly addressing the
factors that go into setting this goal will improve the process.
Determining what our goal is in controlling a harm requires an
examination of who or what we wish to protect, and to what degree. This
70. Vandenbergh, supranote 44, at 902.
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is obviously related to values and questions of fairness, equity, and how
we see ourselves as a society. Examining these questions is difficult, but
necessary. Currently, many of these questions are buried in debate about
policy implementation devices," which masks and obscures society's
ability to make hard choices. Examining these questions explicitly will
again focus the discussion in a way that allows public input. It will also
enable Congress to revisit policy choices about its goals for regulations
with a workable frame of reference.
The purpose of Step III is to realize the goal of Step II by setting a
specific, quantifiable level of environmental output, whether for
emissions, toxicity, or biologic reproduction rates. If we conclude in Step
II that we want to protect the entire American population from any harms
due to ozone exposure, Step III determines at what ambient level ozone
concentration must be set to accomplish that goal. At this step,
decisionmakers must truly define the solution that explicitly
accomplishes the narrative language of the goals of Step II. Although one
might argue that these two steps should be combined, separating them
allows a more discrete consideration of values versus objective evidence.
It may be hard to determine the point at which a goal is attained, but
incorporating this step explicitly allows the EPA, private individuals, and
industry to measure progress against a determined, set, reproducible, and
measurable level. This allows for the critical step of policy program
evaluation, at least with respect to identified numerical goals. Program
evaluation is critical to studying the effectiveness of any policy
implementation.72 In the environmental arena, we have been too long
without it. In the absence of an identifiable target, judgments cannot be
based on environmental quality, but on removed criteria of numbers of
enforcement actions.73 Without program evaluation, it becomes difficult
to know when goals have been accomplished or whether specific levels
must be changed to meet the identified goals. This creates administrative
waste, lowers administrative accountability, and decreases the ability to
make necessary changes.74
As in Step I, scientific uncertainty is arguably the most important
factor in addressing Step III. Indeed, it may be more difficult to set a
specific level at which a goal should be reached than to determine
71. See supraPart I[, Step IV.
72. See Alice Rivlin, Systematic Thinkingfor SocialAction 141 (1971).
73. Vandenbergh, supra note 44, at 909.
74. See id.
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generally that a harm exists. Because of the difficulties with scientific
uncertainty, widely different levels could be supported by credible
scientific evidence. 75 However, unlike the scientific uncertainty at Step I,
the EPA itself may more credibly handle scientific uncertainty at this
level because it is charged with scientific expertise in the environmental
area. 76 Given uncertainty, decisions must be made on the best evidence
available. Does that mean that EPA determinations are always objective?
No, and when different criteria than the goal in step II are used to pick
among equally valid scientific studies, those criteria should be made
explicit. For instance, if the EPA were faced with two equally valid
scientific studies that indicated different safe levels, the agency might
pick one level over the other based on outside benefit-cost issues, such as
whether one level might be less expensive than another. Identifying this
reasoning explicitly points up the other effects of a policy outside of the
goals-which may be a very important issue. Furthermore, it again
creates a point of reference for discussion and allows for informed policy
intervention by the legislative body if necessary.
The purpose of Step IV is to decide how the designated level of
environmental harm allowed will be achieved. This step may be the most
important for the decisionmaker because at this step the decisionmaker
decides what actions will occur to effectuate the level determined in Step
III. How will the policy be implemented? In choosing a particular course
of action, the decisionmaker has many alternatives. In the environmental
area, some common tools are command and control regimes, marketbased incentives, exhortation and education, information requirements,
and even a "no action" alternative.7 7 Certain regimes may be particularly
helpful for one type of environmental problem, or the decisionmaker
may choose to mix the policy tool options. The decisionmaker should
focus on the supplementary factors discussed above, such as traditional
benefit-cost analysis, values, equity, education potential, scientific
uncertainty, and efficiency. Implementation is very important at this
stage because the ability and likelihood of enforcement makes or breaks
the effectiveness of a policy tool in enabling a set goal or level to be
reached. For instance, command and control may be easy to enforce in
many cases because it depends upon an initial outlay of resources and
75. See Flatt, supra note 22, at 602.
76. Landy et al., supra note 24, at 4-5.
77. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: ManagementStrategiesfor Common
Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1 (1991) (providing alternative labels to describe how policy tools work).
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standardized equipment and/or reporting.78 Usually, a firm with a large
initial capital outlay has less incentive to remove or disable it later, and
functioning equipment makes it easy to determine if compliance has
occurred.79 Thus, command and control regimes usually make for easier
enforcement, accountability, and monitoring. Some market incentives, on
the other hand, may seem much more economically efficient when
viewed in isolation, but might become very inefficient indeed if effective
enforcement, such as policing pollution increments, is not really
possible.80
The educational component of any policy option also deserves special
mention at this stage. Certainly, education must be aimed at those who
will be affected. Education tells society how to comply and also ideally
explains the reasoning behind the policy. It can pass the four step
decision points on to the public for optimal understanding and/or
criticism. But, even more importantly, education can provide the kind of
change in values that assist in enforcement of environmental laws as a
whole. Thus, education as a policy implementation mechanism has value
beyond the immediate problem.
IV. THE PROMISED LAND: THE NEW PARADIGM IN ACTION
In order to understand further the workings of this new paradigm, let
us apply it to an issue that was very visible in the news in 1997 and 1998:
the EPA's proposed decision to lower the ambient tropospheric (ground
level) ozone and particulate standard under the Clean Air Act. These
pollutants are responsible for the phenomenon known as "smog. ' '8' The
EPA proposed lowering the limits of these pollutants in late 1996.82 The
proffered reason for the change was that the current allowable ambient
levels of ozone and particulates failed to protect health adequately,
particularly the health of children." Predictably, various organizations
that claimed the changes were expensive, unnecessary, and would hurt

78. See id. at 28.
79. See id.

80. Of course, some types of market incentives can harness the power of the market for selfenforcement and policing. For instance, privatizing ownership of "public" goods like forests could
provide an incentive to the owner to prohibit poaching of trees and/or inefficient logging.
81. See Menell& Stewart, supranote 12, at 233.
82. See Warrick & Yang, supranote 28, at Al.
83. See id.
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the economy opposed the proposed changes.84 How would the four step
paradigm deal with this issue and the controversy it has engendered?
A.

Step I: Is There a Pollutantor EnvironmentalHarm to Be
Addressed?

If one considers this question to refer to the problems of ozone and
fine particulates in general, then the answer is unequivocally yes. There
is strong consensus that these substances are harmful to humans and the
rest of the environment. 8' The more subtle question is whether the
additional increment of pollution allowed by the current regulation, but
omitted under the proposed regulation, is an environmental harm that
needs to be addressed. According to the Natural Resources Defense
Council, over 56,000 deaths a year could be prevented by adopting the
EPA's particulate standards.8 6 This certainly sounds like a serious harm
that needs to be addressed.
However, many opponents of the change in standards state that the
implications of this study, and a similar one for ozone, are overblown,
and that such regulation would be so costly that it would not be worth the
small increase in benefits.87 Thus, scientific uncertainty in the evaluation
of benefits is brought into the picture. This raises the question of values.
What is the paramount value that the Clean Air Act's ambient standards
are designed to protect? Do we save lives at all costs, particularly the
lives of children? Is it fair to put heavy costs on industry or personal
automobile usage to accomplish that? Do other values considerations
help us answer these questions? We know that risk determinations are
affected by whether the risk is voluntarily engaged, so a consideration of
the routes of exposure might help us with this question.88
In the case of air pollution, most people do not choose their own
exposure. If 56,000 people a year died because they liked to breathe
incinerator fumes, then regulation of the harm might not be appropriate.
However, involuntary exposure is considered to be much less acceptable
84. See id.
85. See Menell & Stewart, supranote 12, at 230-33.
86. See Philip J. Hilts, Fine Particles in Air Cause Many Deaths, Study Suggests, N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1996, at A8.
87. See John H. Cushman, Jr., SurpriseSenate Challenge to Pollution Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7,
1996, at A8.
88. See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the Hon. Stephen Breyer's
Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 24 Envtl. L. 1707, 1716 (1994).
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in our society.89 A straight benefit-cost analysis would attempt to
quantify business and convenience costs and benefits of lives saved, but
would not take into account issues such as voluntariness of exposure.
Step I forces the decisionmaker to consider what values govern the
decision before benefit-cost analysis swings into operation. Beyond the
general value of greater regulation of involuntary exposures, Congress
itself has indicated a guiding values choice in the text of the Clean Air
Act. In setting ambient air standards, the EPA is to be concerned with
public health.9"
Recognizing this congressional values decision leaves many of the
critics' arguments moot. It really does not matter whether five or 50,000
lives are saved, or perhaps even if there is a mere possibility of death. If
we are to choose human life above all else, such costs must fall where
they may. As Carol Browner indicated in mid-1997, none of the
criticisms of the EPA's proposed standard convinced her that the EPA's
basic conclusion that lowering the ozone standard would save lives was
untrue. Because that was the consideration the statute required, she stood
by the EPA's decision.9
By making this policy choice explicit and clear, the agency creates a
focused argument against this choice. Although Congress itself set up the
policy choice, several in Congress have indicated that they might choose
to overrule this particular legislative policy choice.9' Senator John
Chafee of Rhode Island, in a letter to the EPA regarding the standard,
noted that the current law required this policy choice, but indicated that
science now "requires that this presumption be set aside."'93 Strangely,
this statement is in a letter to the EPA, when it could become reality by
passage of a new law in Congress with the signature of the President.
Taking Step I and putting the policy choice in relief focuses on
responsibility for the policy choice. This essentially tells Congress to
take responsibility for the policy choices it has made and should make,
according to the public. For instance, if the costs of environmental
compliance are harmful to society as a whole, it is Congress that should
balance the interests. If Congress cannot change this policy choice
89. See id.

90. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
91. See Kimberly Music, EPA's Browner Stands Her Ground in Face of Attacks at House
Hearing,Oil Daily, May 16, 1997, at 1.
92. See Cushman, supranote 87, at AS.
93. Id.
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comfortably with the body politic, then perhaps the policy should not be
changed. Thus, by recognizing the policy choice at the first step in using
this formula, the EPA recognizes a distinct
societal policy choice and
94
be.
should
it
where
responsibility
places the
B.

Step II: What Is Our Goal with Respect to Regulating that Harm?

In determining what the goal of the environmental control should be
in this case, one need only look at the guiding policy from Step I:
protecting human health. If read expansively, this goal from the Clean
Air Act would even specify setting ambient levels at a point at which no
impairment of human health would occur. However, one should also note
that the Clean Air Act seeks to control all human-made air contaminants,
not necessarily all air contaminants, some of which may be natural.95
Thus, our desired goal of regulation would seem to be to alleviate all
health impacts on humans resulting from human-produced or humancaused increases in the ambient ozone or particulate levels.96
C.

Step III: Where Do We Set a Regulatory "Level" to Meet
that Goal?

Step III asks us precisely what ambient level is necessary to achieve
the goal determined in Steps I and II. This requires an in-depth
examination of the scientific evidence. It may be at this time that the
agency will have to decide between competing evidentiary claims. With
respect to ozone, the EPA's proposal is to lower the ambient air
concentration from. 12 parts per million to .08 parts per million.97
The obvious question, after having our goals focused from Step I and
Step II, is the following: If a reduction in ambient ozone exposure to .08
parts per million would save this many lives, what about a reduction to

94. This step might also be the logical point to discuss the need for separating the harms of
particulates from ground level ozone. Some have criticized that only one ambient change might be
necessary. See John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA Advocating Higher Standards to Clean the Air, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1996, at Al. The EPA has not gone ahead with the combined standard, perhaps
because the effects are synergistic in smog formation (an assumption made for purposes of this
experimental analysis), but this would still remain an important issue to examine at this stage.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (1994).
96. Clearly, however, any so-called "natural" air pollution would affect how much human-made
pollution could be tolerated without ill health effects.
97. See Cushman, supra note 94.
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.07 parts per million? Or .06? Would that not save more lives? And if so,
do our goals from Steps I and II require the level to be set at these lower
thresholds rather than the level proposed by the EPA? The answer to this
question and the determining factor in addressing Step III can also be
found in the text of the Clean Air Act.
The history surrounding the development of the policy provision
providing for ambient air standards suggests that at some level these
human-made pollutants do not cause health impacts.98 Moreover, even if
it is logical to assume that an even lower level might be helpful,
Congress, perhaps in recognition of the other values that are competing
against human health, has clearly indicated in the Clean Air Act that
ambient levels should only be lowered to the point at which actual
evidence supports the protection of health.99 Therefore, .08 parts per
million may be an appropriate level because the EPA has quantified
evidence showing a reduction in negative health effects.' Unlike the
first time the EPA set the ozone standard,'' this level can be reached
purely from evidence of health impacts as required by the statute. 0 2
Thus, there is every indication that the level selected by the EPA meets
the goal of protecting human health as established in Step II, and does so
with a level of certainty as required by the text of the Clean Air Act
itself.'0 3
D.

Step IV: How Do We Get to that Level?

The question of "how to reach the desired level" allows a
consideration of different policy implementation devices. These are
alternative ways of reaching a goal that are implemented in different
ways and have different side effects. Under the Clean Air Act, the states
are given responsibility for implementing ambient standards through the
creation of State Implementation Plans (S.I.P.).' 4 Thus, the completion
of the four part implementation plan for air may take place in the state
agency rather than the EPA. Nevertheless, the state will be relying on the
98. See Cushman, supranote 87.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
100. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Administration Issues Its Proposalfor Tightening of Air
Standards, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1996, at Al.
101. See Landy etal., supra note 24, at 71-72.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(2) (1994).
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other steps taken to complete the process. Moreover, the EPA is not out
of the picture altogether. The EPA has oversight of the S.I.P. process and
must approve the state's plan as an effective way to reach the
promulgated ambient standard. 5 In order to gain the EPA's approval,
states may have to structure its plan to fit the EPA's understanding of
how polices work. How then would Step IV apply in this example?
The implementing agency must first determine the range of issues it
may consider. Certainly in addressing the best way to reach this
established ambient level, benefit-cost analysis should be one of the
factors. If alternative policies for reaching the same desired level exist,
then the agency should take the cost of those policies into account as one
factor in determining which of these policies is more desirable. Indeed,
in most instances, cost will be one of the most important considerations
at this stage. However, a goal rarely has two equally effective paths with
only a cost difference to distinguish them. Enforceability, efficiency,
fairness, and any educational impact must also be considered and
balanced with overall cost.
Congress has already explicitly set out some direction. For instance,
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act requires
federal agencies to consider and take steps to mitigate economic impacts
of agency decisions on small businesses. 6 The EPA's interpretation of
how this act should apply
to its decision is currently in dispute, but it is a
0 7
factor to be considered.1

Comparing all of these factors when examining policy implementation
devices with respect to the Clean Air Act is not easy. It requires technical
analyses, studies of sources, air movement, and dissipation, and analyses
of exposures. A complete analysis cannot be performed within the
limited scope of this Article, but some factors relating to differing policy
implementation devices can be examined in order to explore the
workings of Step IV in this example.
At least some of the expected reduction necessary to meet the new
standard may have to come from a reduction in vehicular emissions,
which include both particulates and the precursor compounds (such as

105. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(2).
106. 15 U.S.C.A. § 657 (West Supp. 1997).
107. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Dozens ofPartiesSue EPA over Air Rules, 66 U.S. L. Wk.
2195 (1997).
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Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)) for the creation of ground level ozone. ' °8
However, before going forward with a plan simply to cut automobile
emissions, one must also consider other factors. What kind of reduction
would be most fair and equitable and which would be the easiest to
enforce?
In considering the human impacts of various proposals on vehicular
restrictions, one would likely pay attention to the needs of lower socioeconomic groups for vehicular travel. Much of the pollution from
automobiles comes from older models, which are more likely to be used
by members of lower socio-economic groups. Therefore, controlling
pollution by reducing allowances for older automobiles without
compensation might be very cost effective, but unpalatable for its
distributive effects on society.0 9 Indeed, this distributive impact may be
one explanation as to why such automobiles are not already regulated
more stringently."0 However, such exemptions may no longer be
possible if ozone standards must be lowered further. As they are already
doing, agencies will have to continue to consider the tradeoffs in equity
with pollution reductions, perhaps prompting them to look at ways of
controlling older automobiles while undertaking ameliorative efforts to
undercut the inequitable effects. Possible ameliorative options include
waivers or variances for high cost repairs,"' compensation, increase in
public transit options, or the distribution of vouchers to allow for
upgrades to less polluting automobiles.
If agencies do not wish to tackle the problem of older, polluting
vehicles, they may try driving restrictions, gasoline taxes, or general
mass transit subsidies. These programs might have effects similar to
direct automobile control but different costs, distributive effects,
different educational messages," 2 and different levels of intrusion into
108. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Stricter Air Rules Could Place Focus on the Midvest, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 1, 1996, at Al.
109. See Rose, supra note 77, at 38.
110. Only recently have older vehicles in the City of Atlanta been required to have enhanced
Inspection and Maintenance procedures even though it is known that they are less likely to operate
efficiently. See Charles Seabrook, State Delays New Testing on Emissions,Atlanta J. & Const., Dec.
4, 1997, at Cl.
111. See Joey Ledford, The Lane Ranger: Go Ahead and Get that Clunker Tested, Atlanta J. &
Const., Nov. 23, 1997, at D2.
112. For instance, gasoline taxes may not be associated directly with pollution control in the
minds of many citizens and therefore may carry a different education message then do mass transit
subsidies. Mass transit subsidies may help to create a different conservation ethic as well as address
other problems of community and social isolation.
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private citizens' lives. The relationships of many of these factors to
benefit-cost issues have already been studied or are being explored. For
instance, it has been estimated that people may prefer voluntary
restrictions to involuntary ones." 3
Thus, although the problems of implementation in Part IV are
complex, a consideration of even a few alternatives gives the agency an
awareness of choices, which factors need to be considered, and how
those factors should be weighed. At this stage, it may also be appropriate
for an agency to solicit public input to broaden its understanding of the
choices and tradeoffs required by differing policy implementation
devices. Certainly, the Clean Air Act leaves the choice of
implementation of ambient air standards to the states through the S.I.P.
program so that the states must take into account public desires and
tradeoff choices, through reasonable notice and public hearing, in
deciding how best to address that state's particular pollution problem." 4
The state's legislative body may also choose to address these policy
issues directly." 5 However these issues are ultimately addressed, Step IV
provides the necessary point at which to narrow what the issues are and
how the tradeoffs can relate to one another-a task suited to an agency's
technical expertise as informed by public input.
V.

CONCLUSION

The EPA's current method of environmental policy analysis is the
cause of much friction and contributes to disrepute and disrespect for the
agency. The public's growing clamor for change almost led to wholesale
changes in U.S. environmental law in 1994 and 1995.16 Some have made
a concerted effort to use traditional benefit-cost analysis to curtail the
amount of environmental regulation." 7 The traditional benefit-cost
paradigm is on its last legs, and society is clamoring for a new

113. See Flatt, supranote 88, at 1716.
114. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The FailureofEnforcement in the Clean
Water Act), 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1997).
115. Indeed, Congress itself addressed the tradeoffs inherent in policy implementation devices
when in 1977 it explicitly prohibited the EPA from requiring certain land use controls in the
implementation of the ambient standards. See Frederick R. Anderson et al., Environmental
Protection:Law and Policy 141 (1984).
116. See generally Flatt, supra note 22, at 585 (discussing congressional push to alter review of
environmental decisionmaking).
117. See id. at 605.
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"religion"--a new way of thinking about the environment. In order for
our society to grapple successfully with the choices it needs and wants to
make about its environment and the environment's relationship to the
citizenry, a new paradigm must come forward. This Article's proposed
four step analysis is a good candidate for a new paradigm. This paradigm
will purposefully identify all values at work in our environmental arena
and related values and will put them in a forum where open discussion
and analysis can take place. The paradigm involves some subjectivity,
which will ultimately prove more beneficial to the population at large
than the so-called objective benefit-cost analysis in current use. Just as
the objective old testament standard of "measured forgiveness" was
replaced with the subjective new testament concept of "unconditional
forgiveness, 1 . the new paradigm may give all, not just some, a way to
get to environmental heaven.

118. Hebrews 10 (American Standard).
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